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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has vacillated over the
years in its fidelity to the doctrine of standing, but as of late is
quite strict in enforcing this prerequisite to stating a justiciable
claim.1 For half a century, however, the Supreme Court has
reduced the rigor of its standing requirements when the claim on

R.B. Price Professor and Isabelle Wade & Paul C. Lyda Professor of Law,
University of Missouri.
1. Standing is a doctrine of justiciability derived from the “Cases” and
“Controversies” provision in Article III of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2, cl. 1. The doctrine has three requirements: individualized injury, a causal
link between the alleged wrongdoing and the injury, and the matter is
redressable by traditional judicial remedies. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568
U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). For a survey of the Court’s cases on standing that cycle
from strict to lax in adherence to doctrine, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Limiting
Article III Standing to “Accidental” Plaintiffs: Lessons from Environmental and
Animal Law Cases, 45 GA. L. REV. 1, 26–49 (2010).
*
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the merits arises under the Establishment Clause.2 There are
two types of these reduced-rigor cases. The first type has drawn
the most attention. It involves taxpayer standing where a
plaintiff challenges the use of government resources said to
improperly advance religion. The second type of reduced-rigor
standing is where a claim is brought because of a plaintiff’s
“unwanted exposure” to religious expression by government.3 The
Supreme Court has sharply narrowed but not entirely done away
with taxpayer standing. Not so with unwanted-exposure
standing. The latter remains a common feature of contemporary
litigation under the Establishment Clause and warrants closer
examination.
As will be shown in Part I of this article, taxpayer standing is
presently permitted only when tax monies have been extracted
from a plaintiff and appropriated by a legislature as funding for a
statutory program that expressly contemplates the use of the
money for religion. It is thought that only in this circumstance
can it plausibly be said that a taxpayer-plaintiff suffered injury
in that she was coerced into contributing her money in aid of
religion.
Part II takes up the Supreme Court’s reduced-rigor standing
when a plaintiff objects because she is personally exposed to a
religious symbol or other religious expression attributable to the
government. Typical of such cases is where the government has
sponsored a public prayer, or constructed on public land a
2. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .” U.S. CONST.
amend. 1.
3. Some refer to this reduced-rigor standing as “offended observer” cases.
This is a mistake. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Nonestablishment, Standing, and
the Soft Constitution, 85 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 407, 439–40 (2011) (noting others
have used the term “offended observer,” but acknowledging that an atheist
caused to “feel like ‘an outsider’” is distinguishable from an injury-by-exposure
bystander). As shown below, the nature of the relevant harm is not emotional or
psychological offense, nor is it the intensity of the offense. See, infra, notes 105–
06, 108, 119–20, and accompanying text. Further, the successful plaintiff is
more than a mere observer, but one who disagrees with her government’s
message. See, infra, notes 107–10, 124–25, and accompanying text. The term
“offended observer” is a way for the governmental defendant to belittle these
Establishment Clause claims and thereby gain a rhetorical advantage in an
effort to have them dismissed at the outset for lack of standing.
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Christian cross or monument to the Ten Commandments. These
unwanted-exposure cases have been consistent over the last
sixty-six years in allowing standing where a plaintiff’s status as
student, government official, juror, or the like has resulted in
personal exposure to the government’s religious message with
which she disagrees. Being a mere witness to unconstitutional
behavior by one’s government is not normally sufficient to vest a
person with standing to sue.4 So, for example, observing the
municipal police search a neighbor’s home in violation of the
Fourth Amendment does not vest one with standing to sue. The
injury one experiences as a result of such police action is a
generalized grievance shared by everyone in the municipality,
and thus not one personalized as required for standing. But
government-expression cases involving governmental displays of
religion are treated differently. Just how it is that this “injury”
of unwanted exposure to a religious message is not a grievance
we all share when our government operates outside of its
constitutional restraints will require some explaining by the
Supreme Court. What the Court has to say on that matter will
also tell us something about the unique operation of the
Establishment Clause.
Part III of this article utilizes the factual record in Salazar v.
Buono5 to illustrate some of the subtle features of unwantedexposure standing, and to test its boundaries. Finally, Part IV
frontally takes-up what it is about the operation and meaning of
the Establishment Clause that is unique. Because the Court
employs the no-establishment principle much like a structural
clause separating church and state, that boundary can be
transgressed without anyone having suffered individualized
injury-in-fact. That in turn has led the Supreme Court to respond
by adopting these specialized rules of reduced-rigor standing.

4. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984) (“Recognition of
standing in such circumstances would transform the federal courts into no more
than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned
bystanders.”) (internal quotations omitted).
5. 559 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (plurality op.).
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I. TAXPAYER STANDING
The Supreme Court’s long-standing rule is to disallow
taxpayer standing.6 A taxpayer as plaintiff simply lacks the
individualized injury to have a personal stake in the outcome of
the litigation.7 In Flast v. Cohen,8 the Supreme Court rather
dramatically introduced a test for determining when a departure
from the long-standing rule would be permitted and taxpayer
standing allowed.9 The double-nexus test generated in Flast was
framed with sufficient generality to permit taxpayers to
challenge a range of state and federal appropriations and tax
expenditures. Nevertheless, in no instance since Flast has
taxpayer standing ever been permitted except when the claim on
the merits alleged a violation of the Establishment Clause.10
This narrowing of taxpayer standing to only cases invoking
the requirement of church-state separation should have
redoubled efforts by the Supreme Court to explain what is unique
about the Establishment Clause such that taxpayer-plaintiffs
6. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (decided along with
Massachusetts v. Mellon). Of course, the rule does not apply to situations where
the taxpayer-plaintiff is suing because she is due a tax refund or because she is
the victim of an illegal tax. In such instances the taxpayer has individualized
injury.
7. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 343 (2006) (rejecting the
notion that an allegedly improper legislative appropriation increased the
plaintiff’s burden of taxation as little more than a remote and indeterminate
claim to an interest in the moneys of the U.S. Treasury that is shared by
millions).
8. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Flast held that federal taxpayers had standing to
challenge provisions of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
providing federal aid for educational equipment, as well as for classes in
reading and arithmetic, to nonpublic schools most of which were religious
schools. The case was then remanded to the trial court for consideration of the
merits with respect to the Establishment Clause.
9. The Court in Flast said that to have standing a taxpayer must show
two things. “First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between the status
and the type of legislative enactment attacked. . . . Secondly, the taxpayer must
establish a nexus between the status and the precise nature of the
constitutional infringement alleged.” Id. at 102.
10. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 347–49 (2006) (denying
taxpayer standing in suit alleging a rights violation under the Dormant
Commerce Clause); see Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587,
609–10 (2007) (plurality op.).
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receive preferred treatment in lawsuits that normally would be
dismissed as lacking individualized injury and, hence, no
standing.11 While that has not happened,12 standing in Flast
recently came under serious challenge in Hein v. Freedom From
Religion Foundation, Inc.13 The Hein plurality held that taxpayer
standing did not extend to a general appropriation by Congress
to fund the day-to-day operations of the Executive Office of the
President, especially where the executive had broad discretion as
to how those funds were spent in furtherance of the President’s
policy initiatives.14 The plurality framed the issue of executive
discretion as a concern for separation of powers—the judiciary
not trenching upon the authority of the President—being equal to
if not prior to any concern that the President was using his
spending authority to improperly advance religion.15 In addition

11. Flast did reference back to James Madison and defeat of the religious
assessment bill in Virginia during 1784–1785. 392 U.S. at 103–04. But there
was no attempt in Flast to tailor taxpayer standing to the facts as they
happened in Virginia, detail as to how the objectionable assessment bill would
have operated, and Madison’s precise arguments for opposing the assessment
bill.
12. Between Flast and Hein, two Supreme Court cases examined
assertions of taxpayer standing where the underlying claim on the merits was
brought under the Establishment Clause. The results were mixed. One case
found taxpayer standing and the other did not. In Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464
(1982), the Court held that taxpayers lacked standing to challenge a decision by
a federal executive agency to declare certain government-owned real estate as
surplus and then transfer the real estate free of charge under the Property
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, to a Christian college. Valley Forge, 454
U.S. at 466–69. Flast permitted taxpayer standing only when the taxpayerplaintiff was challenging Congress’s use of its Taxing and Spending Power, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 478–82. In Bowen v. Kendrick,
487 U.S. 589 (1988), the Court held that taxpayer-plaintiffs had standing to
challenge a congressional social service program that provided grant funding to
counseling centers promoting teen chastity, expressly requiring that religious
as well as secular centers be considered. Id. at 618–20. The Court went on to
uphold the constitutionality of the program on its face, but remanded for
further proceedings with respect to “as applied” challenges. Id. at 600–18, 620–
22.
13. 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (plurality op.).
14. Id. at 609–14.
15. Id. at 611–12; see id. at 615–18 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasizing
separation of powers); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S.
Ct. 1138, 1146–47 (2013) (emphasizing the origin of standing doctrine in
separation of powers).
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to not wanting the Judicial Branch to oversee discretionary
spending by the Executive Branch, the Hein plurality insisted
that taxpayer standing be allowed only when the legislative
program in question expressly contemplated that the
appropriated monies would go to religion.16 But Hein did little to
add to our knowledge of why taxpayer standing was ever proper
and thus how it is that the Establishment Clause could be
violated in the absence of a plaintiff with individualized injury.
In particular, Hein made no attempt to identify the sort of
specialized harms that were protected by the Establishment
Clause such that a specialized rule of taxpayer standing was
justified.
The circle connecting reduced-rigor taxpayer standing with
James Madison and the history of Virginia’s disestablishment,
events which were in turn connected with the role of the
Establishment Clause in separating church and state, was finally
completed in the case of Arizona Christian School Tuition
Organization v. Winn.17 The Court in Winn denied taxpayer
standing to challenge a recently adopted provision in Arizona’s
income tax law that provided credits to taxpayers making
charitable contributions to nonprofit corporations organized for
the purpose of awarding scholarships to K-12 students attending
private schools, including religious schools. For purposes of
taxpayer standing, Winn said that a taxpayer’s injury remediable
under the Establishment Clause must entail the “extraction and
spending of tax money in aid of religion.”18 This limitation on the
nature of the taxpayer-plaintiff’s injury or personalized harm
was attributable to the origin of the Establishment Clause in the
work of James Madison and his Memorial and Remonstrance, a
protest petition circulated in Virginia during the summer and
early fall of 1785 in opposition to a bill in the state legislature
proposing a religious assessment for the support of Christian
clergy.19 As the Memorial makes clear, for Madison it was not the
16.
17.
18.
19.

Hein, 551 U.S. at 603–09 (plurality op.).
563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
Id. at 1446 (quotation marks and brackets omitted).
A full account of the historical events contributing to disestablishment
in Virginia appears in Carl H. Esbeck, Protestant Dissent and the Virginia
Disestablishment, 1776–1786, 7 GEO. J. OF L. & PUB. POLICY 51 (2009)
[hereinafter Esbeck, Protestant Dissent]. This includes a detailed parsing of

612

2013]

Establishment Clause Standing

amount of the tax, a levy which he opposed even if the
assessment were “three pence only.”20 Rather than the dollar
amount of the pecuniary harm, for Madison the relevant injury
was that the religious tax payments were coerced and thus
contrary to a principle called voluntaryism.21 For Madison, as
well as for the Baptists and Presbyterians who joined him in
opposing the Virginia assessment bill,22 as a matter of religious
belief any contribution or tithe to one’s church must be voluntary.
It made no difference to Madison that the Virginia bill permitted
each taxpayer to designate the church of his choice to receive his
tax allotment via the county collector. The tax was still coercive.
As Winn explained, because the history of this no-establishment
principle limited claims by taxpayer-plaintiffs to coercive
extractions of their money to be applied in aid of religion,
taxpayer standing had to be denied on the facts in Winn. The
Arizona tax credit did not involve the extraction of tax money

Madison’s arguments in his Memorial and Remonstrance. Id. at 82–85, 92–98.
20. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1446 (“In Madison’s view, government should not
‘force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of
any one establishment.’” (quoting 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 186 (G.
Hunt ed. 1901)).
21. Id. (“In the Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison objected to the
proposed assessment on the ground that it would coerce a form of religious
devotion in violation of conscience.”).
22. Giving to one’s church was seen as an act of religious devotion.
Baptists in particular, but other Christians as well, believed such giving must
be voluntary. Esbeck, Protestant Dissent, supra note 19, at 96. Baptists and
other dissenters in Virginia were an essential base of political support for
James Madison. CHRIS DEROSE, FOUNDING RIVALS: MADISON VS. MONROE, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS, AND THE ELECTION THAT SAVED A NATION (2011). Religious
dissenters first worked in support of Madison in April 1785 to re-elect him as a
delegate to the Virginia legislature. Id. at 102–03 (the pending legislative issue
being the Virginia religious assessment bill). In June 1788, when ratification of
the federal Constitution was being debated in Virginia, Madison defended the
document as not delegating power to the federal government to interfere with
religion, work that favorably influenced the Baptists in the February 1789
election. Id. at 189–90, 226–27. Baptists, Lutherans, and other dissenters voted
heavily for Madison in the election of February 1789, sending him to Congress
where he led the effort to report out a Bill of Rights. Id. at 226–30, 238–40, 246–
49, 258.
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from the plaintiffs who filed the lawsuit. Nor was the earning of a
tax credit by a charitable contributor an act of legislative
spending in aid of religion.23 Hence, there was no constitutionally
cognizable injury in the sense contemplated by the principle of
voluntaryism.
Winn also indicated that “extraction” and “spending” must
both be present to make sense of taxpayer standing, just as both
were present in the defeated Virginia assessment bill. This goes
to causation, an additional requirement for standing. A taxpayerplaintiff’s tax monies must be traceable through the general
treasury before being spent on religion or a religious
organization. Only when there is such a causal link can it be said
that there is coercion of the taxpayer-plaintiff to aid religion. The
plaintiffs in Winn could not, of course, trace their tax payments
to the religious schools.24
The third requirement for standing is redressability. A
taxpayer-plaintiff’s injury—a transgression of the principle of
voluntaryism—is not redressable by an injunction against a
legislative appropriation to the religious schools in question. As
Winn pointed out, there were no such appropriations in Arizona
to enjoin.25
From an economic perspective the distinction between a tax
credit and an appropriation is a matter of mere form. Both
deplete the state treasury.26 From the perspective of the
Establishment Clause, however, the plaintiffs who sued as
taxpayers failed to suffer religious coercion in the sense of
transgressing the principle of voluntaryism. And such coercion is
23. Winn, 563 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1446–47.
24. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1447–48 (Taxpayer plaintiffs “cannot satisfy

the requirements of causation and redressability. When the government collects
and spends taxpayer money, governmental choices are responsible for the
transfer of wealth. In that case a resulting subsidy of religious activity is, for
purposes of Flast, traceable to the government’s expenditures. And an
injunction against those expenditures would address the objections of
conscience raised by taxpayer-plaintiffs.”).
25. Id.
26. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1447 (“It is easy to see that tax credits and
governmental expenditures can have similar economic consequences, at least
for beneficiaries whose tax liability is sufficiently large to take full advantage of
the credit.”).
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the personalized harm protected by the Establishment Clause, at
least as illustrated by the 1785 Virginia assessment experience.
That is the historical experience the Supreme Court deemed
relevant and that Winn read into the Establishment Clause.27
Notwithstanding this confining of Flast to Madison and the
Virginia disestablishment experience, taxpayer standing after
Winn is still reduced-rigor standing. It is still a stretch to
characterize as “coercive” and thus a personalized harm, the
payment by a plaintiff of a general federal tax into the U.S.
Treasury, where the money is commingled with monies from
millions of other sources, and then appropriated by Congress in
aid of a program that expressly designates some or all of the
allotted money to religion. And tracing the causal link between
the points at which a plaintiff initially pays her general federal
tax and the time at which Congress appropriates funds from the
U.S. Treasury to religion is an abstraction. Indeed, the latter
moment in time would likely not be known to the taxpayerplaintiff, which is to say the plaintiff would not even know when
the relevant injury befell her. Accordingly, Winn is still not fully
exacting when it comes to traditional standing doctrine.
In two respects caution should be exercised so as not to overread Winn. First, Winn does not conflate the test for taxpayer
standing with the merits of a prima facie claim under the
Establishment Clause. Even if a taxpayer-plaintiff satisfies the
standing requirements of Winn, she may lose on the merits
because the program of governmental aid satisfies the
requirements of religious neutrality. Religious neutrality is
where the government enacts a program of aid that: (i) has a
27. There remains one difference between the Virginia religious
assessment bill, opposed by Madison in 1784–1785, and the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, at issue in Flast. The Virginia proposal was a
special tax ear-marked for religion. When collected, the funds were kept
separated by the county collector. The money was kept separate because in time
it was paid over to each church according to each taxpayer’s designation. Flast
involved a general federal tax where the proceeds went to the general U.S.
Treasury. So the causal link between extracting and spending begins to
breakdown. But Flast was a case where it was known that the tax revenues
appropriated under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 were
to be paid to religious schools. This was because in 1965 nearly all nonpublic
schools were religious schools. Hein, 551 U.S. at 604 n. 3.
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secular purpose; (ii) the recipients are eligible without regard to
religion; and (iii) administrative care is taken so that public
funds are not diverted to an explicitly religious purpose.28 In this
manner, a government’s program of aid to assist private-sector
providers of education, health care, and social services, has been
upheld in the face of Establishment Clause challenges.29
Second, Winn does not mean that all successful claims under
the Establishment Clause require a showing of coercion
(identified in Winn with the principle of voluntaryism). In many
instances a plaintiff can prevail in an Establishment Clause case
without showing religious coercion.30 All that Winn stands for is
that an assertion of taxpayer standing requires the proper
showing of coercion. But that narrowing in Winn is quite enough
such that there will be a decline in the successful use of taxpayer
standing.
II. UNWANTED-EXPOSURE STANDING
Unlike the recent narrowing of taxpayer standing, the
Supreme Court’s cases on unwanted-exposure standing have
28. When it comes to programs of direct financial aid, the Establishment
Clause requires only that the three elements set forth in the text be satisfied.
These neutrality principles were first clearly adopted by the Court in Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (upholding federal program of special education
services when students at religious and public schools are treated equally). See
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality op.) (upholding federal
program providing aid to K-12 education, treating religious and public schools
equally). Where the aid to religion is indirect, such as via a parental voucher or
tax deduction, the neutrality principle has been the law much longer. See, e.g.,
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (school vouchers); Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (income tax deduction for parents of children
attending schools, including religious schools).
29. See, e.g., Freedom From Religion Found. v. McCallum, 214 F. Supp. 2d
905 (W.D. Wis. 2002), aff’d 324 F. 3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that
Establishment Clause did not prevent direct state aid to faith-intensive drug
treatment center where a choice of secular and religious programs was
available to addicts without regard to the religious character of the programs).
30. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 221–23 (1963) (Free
Exercise Clause claim is predicated on a showing of coercion, whereas a claim
under the Establishment Clause need not be so attended); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (same; noting that voluntariness of student prayer may
defeat a free-exercise claim but not a violation of the no-establishment
principle).
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drawn little attention and remain fairly expansive. Typical of
such cases is where the government places a Christmas crèche on
the courthouse lawn or Congress inserts “under God” into the
nation’s Pledge of Allegiance. The mere observance of
unconstitutional behavior by one’s government does not vest an
individual with standing to sue. For example, should a public
school student observe a fellow student being expelled for
misconduct without notice or opportunity for a hearing, she
cannot sue having witnessed the Due Process Clause violation.
Certain church-state cases, however, have proven to be different.
Reduced rigor in the required injury-in-fact for standing has
been permitted in cases challenging religious symbols or other
religious speech attributable to government.31 These unwantedexposure cases occur when the underlying claim on the merits is
that the Establishment Clause is violated because the
government has taken sides in a religious matter. Such a
violation can occur and yet no one suffers a personalized harm or
injury. Unwanted exposure is a proxy for the missing injury-infact, thus allowing the courts to proceed to adjudicate the claim
on the merits. A plaintiff alleging a violation of church-state
boundaries can have unwanted-exposure standing if: (i) she
objects because government is siding with a religion other than
her own; (ii) she objects because government is siding with a
religion and she subscribes to no religion; or (iii) she objects
because government is siding with a religion that is hers but that
the sponsorship is actually harmful to her religion. This third
option can be conceptually difficult; but with a little reflection
one can see how, given the nature of religion, government efforts
to advance a particular religion often have a corrupting effect.
Several of James Madison’s arguments in his Memorial and

31. These cases are limited to those involving religious symbols, spoken
words, written words, or other speech attributable to the government. A mere
act of the government alleged to imply a “message” to third-party observers
about the government’s position on a matter is insufficient. In re Navy
Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756, 764–65 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (claim by non-liturgical
Protestant chaplains that others like them were discriminated against in
Navy’s retirement program could not assert their standing to sue based on
exposure to unwanted “message” alleged to be communicated to them by
discrimination against their fellow chaplains).
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Remonstrance were about how religious establishment is actually
harmful to religion.32
It is normal for the government to takes sides on all sorts of
issues, including controversial ones. Government has that power.
But government does not have the power to take sides on a
religious question.33 The latter is prohibited by the
Establishment Clause.34 This specialized treatment of religious
disputes thereby calls for a specialized rule of standing if the
objecting party is going to be able to lodge a claim under the
32. Esbeck, Protestant Dissent, supra note 19, at 83–84, 92–97. For
historical arguments by James Madison concerning how establishment
corrupted Christianity and the church, see id. at 92–94 nn.164–65, 167–76. For
religious arguments by Madison concerning how no-establishment benefits
churches and religion, see id. at 94–96 nn.178–82, 184, 187–90. For prudential
arguments by Madison concerning the dangers of establishment, see id. at 97
nn.191–96.
33. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 845–46 (1995)
(university regulations that “required public officials to scan and interpret
student publications to discern their underlying philosophic assumptions
respecting religious theory and belief” was inconsistent with the Establishment
Clause); Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (“The government may
not . . . lend its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious
authority or dogma.”); id. at 887 (“Judging the centrality of different religious
practices is akin to the unacceptable business of evaluating the relative merits
of differing religious claims. . . . Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we
have warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a
particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim.”) (internal
citations omitted); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269–72 nn. 6, 9 and 11
(1981) (government must avoid inquiring into the significance of certain words,
practices, and events to differing religious faiths); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
92-93 (1976) (while government may speak out on controversial public issues, it
must remain neutral in religious disputes); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (1 Wall.)
679, 727 (1871) (there is no civil court jurisdiction to resolve disputes over
religious doctrine, polity, or church discipline).
34. That government does not have the power to take sides on a religious
question or dispute is a particular application of a more general rule. The rule is
that no-establishment is best achieved to the degree that modern government
uses its considerable powers to minimize its impact on religion. This not only
helps to prevent the corruption of religion by the state, but prevents the
oppression of personal choice in religious matters which can exacerbate division
within the body politic along religious lines. See Douglas Laycock, Formal,
Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV.
993, 1001 (1990); see also Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out
Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 38 (2000); Andrew Koppelman, And I Don’t Care
What It Is: Religious Neutrality in American Law, 39 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1115,
1116, 1120, 1128–29 (2013).
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Establishment Clause. This is because when government takes
sides in a religious matter there is often no one with a
personalized injury. Consider the nontheist who when using U.S.
coins and paper money observes the engraving “In God We
Trust.” The putative injury is similar to a generalized grievance
that we all share when our government fails to operate within its
constitutional restraints. As a proxy for personalized injury the
Supreme Court seized upon unwanted exposure, and in this way
ensures that the plaintiff would have the necessary incentive to
vigorously pursue the legal and factual presentation of the
dispute in an adversarial setting.
The United States Supreme Court’s cases that invoke the
Establishment Clause and claim unwanted exposure to
government religious speech are fairly numerous—sixteen.
However, in nearly all of these cases—twelve out of the sixteen—
the plaintiff’s standing was not challenged by the government
and thus was not argued by counsel and decided by the Supreme
Court. These twelve cases, therefore, are not binding precedent
when it comes to what is required to bring an unwanted-exposure
case as a proxy for traditional standing.35 But the twelve are
illustrative of the many ways these exposure cases arise. The
four remaining cases do address unwanted-exposure standing
and are sufficient to suggest broader principles. For the
presentation to be complete, all sixteen cases are reviewed below
in chronological order.
The first case of interest is McCollum v. Board of
Education.36 McCollum invalidated a local public school’s
program which allowed nearby churches to hold elective religion
classes in classrooms during regular school hours. The plaintiff
was a resident and taxpayer of the local school district, and “a
parent whose child was then enrolled in the Champaign public
schools.”37 A parent has standing in her capacity as a parent for
35. Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S.
Ct. 1436, 1448–49 (2011) (pointing to several cases which held that where lack
of standing was not raised on appeal, then the case is of no precedential value
on that point).
36. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). In McCollum, the Supreme Court for the first time
found an Establishment Clause violation.
37. Id. at 205. The description of plaintiff as a school district taxpayer is a
matter relevant to taxpayer standing but not unwanted-exposure standing. In a
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the injury caused by the unwanted exposure to her minor
children. Hence, the child need not be a party. Relevant to the
unwanted exposure of the plaintiff’s child to the religion classes,
the Court said:
The operation of the State’s compulsory education system thus
assists and is integrated with the program of religious
instruction carried on by separate religious sects. Pupils
compelled by law to go to school for secular education are
released in part from their legal duty upon the condition that
they attend the religious classes.38

The government’s challenge to plaintiff’s standing was
rejected without analysis in a single sentence: “A second ground
for the motion to dismiss is that the appellant lacks standing to
maintain the action, a ground which is also without merit.”39
Plaintiff was not personally exposed to what was taught in the
religion classes, nor was her child.40 If a parent did not give
permission for her child to attend one of the religion class, the
child was “not released from public school duties; they were
concurring opinion Justice Jackson added that plaintiff was an atheist. Id. at
234.
38. Id. at 209.
39. Id. at 206 (citing “Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 443, 445, 464.”).
Coleman v. Miller addressed the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review a
lawsuit by Kansas legislators who had cast a vote against ratification of a
proposed amendment to the federal Constitution. They claimed that their vote
as state legislators was not properly counted by Kansas officials and that the
ratification should be deemed defeated—rather than passed, as reported to
Congress by Kansas officials. To that extent the legislators’ claim of interest
was different from that of a mere citizen of Kansas, they were found to have
standing. 307 U.S. at 443, 445. We do not have a clear explanation of Coleman’s
applicability to the question of standing in McCollum.
40. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 205, 209–10, 212 (1948). In a
concurring opinion Justice Jackson expands on this point. He rejects standing
based on plaintiff’s school-age child being an observer of the release-time class
but not subject to coercion to attend one of them. Id. at 232. Jackson goes on to
write that to the extent that other students “join and he does not, it sets him
apart as a dissenter, which is humiliating,” that emotion cannot confer
standing. “Even admitting this to be true, it may be doubted whether the
Constitution which, of course, protects the right to dissent, can be construed
also to protect one from the embarrassment that always attends nonconformity
whether in religion, politics, behavior or dress.” Id. at 232–33.
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required to leave their classrooms and go to some other place in
the school building for pursuit of their secular studies.”41 In this
manner the compulsory education law was seen by the Court as
holding non-attending students on campus pursuing their
educational duties. The other students—those attending a
religion class—were characterized as being released from their
compulsory education requirement. As the Court saw it, standing
was predicated on the local school’s enforcement of the
compulsory education law in a manner favoring religion.
Although the plaintiff’s child was not personally exposed to the
religion classes, the child did have to assume a special duty to
avoid such unwanted exposure—namely, remaining fully under
the compulsory education law while his classmates enjoyed
release time. On the merits, the on-campus release-time program
was found to be in violation of the Establishment Clause.
The plaintiff in Doremus v. Board of Education42 challenged
teacher-led devotional Bible reading in New Jersey public
schools. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits. The father
of a student subject to the unwanted exercise had brought the
suit, but his child subsequently graduated and thus the claim for
prospective relief was mooted.43
Engel v. Vitale44 was a challenge to a statewide program of
daily voluntary classroom prayer in the New York public schools.
The plaintiffs were “parents of ten pupils insisting that use of
this official prayer in the public schools was contrary to the
beliefs, religion, or religious practices of both themselves and
their children.”45 The government did not challenge the standing
of the plaintiffs. That is surprising because the objecting parents
and their school-age children could opt-out of the prayer
exercise.46 Because of the opt-out, the plaintiffs’ children could
have avoided the prayer albeit undertaking some inconvenience

41. Id. at 209.
42. 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
43. Id. at 432–33. Doremus was also a case where standing was sought on

the basis of plaintiff being a taxpayer. That too was unsuccessful. Id. at 433–35.
44. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
45. Id. at 423.
46. Id. at 423 n. 2.
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to do so. On the merits, the classroom prayer was found to violate
the Establishment Clause.
The fact that the “observance on the part of the students is
voluntary,” however, did not entirely escape the Court’s notice.47
The prayer being voluntary would make a difference under the
Free Exercise Clause, explained the Court, where coercion is an
essential element of the prima facie claim.48 But with respect to
the Establishment Clause, coercion or compulsory exposure to
the prayer need not be shown. This is because one of the objects
of the modern Establishment Clause is to separate church and
state so as to prevent injury to either or both,49 as distinct from
personal religious harm.
School District of Abington Township v. Schempp50 involved
consolidated cases from Philadelphia and Baltimore, both
challenging daily classroom prayer and devotional Bible reading
in public schools. In both instances, the religious exercises were
optional.51 In the Philadelphia case, the plaintiffs were:
Edward Lewis Schempp, his wife Sidney, and their children,
Roger and Donna [are] members of the Unitarian Church in
Germantown, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where they . . .
regularly attend religious services. . . . The children attend the
Abington Senior High School, which is a public school operated
by appellant district.52

Also, “Edward Schempp and the children testified as to specific
religious doctrines purveyed by a literal reading of the Bible
‘which were contrary to the religious beliefs which they held and
to their familial teaching.’”53
In the Baltimore case, the plaintiffs were “Mrs. Madelyn
Murray and her son, William J. Murray III, . . . both professed

47. Id. at 430.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 431–33. For more discussion concerning the unique nature of the

Establishment Clause, see, infra, Part IV.
50. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
51. Id. at 224–25.
52. Id. at 206.
53. Id. at 208.
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atheists.”54 The “petition particularized the [Murrays’] atheistic
beliefs and stated that the [school] rule, as practiced, violated
their rights ‘in that it threatens their religious liberty by placing
a premium on belief as against non-belief and subjects their
freedom of conscience to the rule of the majority.’”55
Having in mind that the exercises were voluntary, the lack of
standing to challenge the religious practices under the
Establishment Clause was raised by the government.56 The Court
disagreed and reasoned that plaintiffs had standing as follows:
[T]he requirements for standing to challenge state action under
the Establishment Clause, unlike those relating to the Free
Exercise Clause, do not include proof that particular religious
freedom are infringed. . . . The parties here are school children
and their parents, who are directly affected by the laws and
practices against which their complaints are directed. These
interests surely suffice to give the parties standing to
complain.57

Schempp cited to all three prior cases.58 Certainly the students in
Engel and Doremus were directly exposed to the unwanted
expression, whereas the student in McCollum had to forego
release from compulsory education to avoid unwanted exposure.
What was characterized in Schempp as “directly affected” by the
unconstitutional practices of the government was deemed by the
Court as sufficient injury for purposes of standing.
As in Engel, the Schempp Court said that it was unconcerned
that plaintiffs did not prove they were victims of the
government’s coercion.59 Coercion is an element of a Free
Exercise Clause claim which is rights-based, but compulsion is
not required to state a claim under the Establishment Clause.
This is because the Establishment Clause is about policing the
boundary between church and state. “[T]he Court found that the
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 211.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 224 n. 9.
Id.
Id. Doremus never reached the issue of unwanted-exposure standing
because the case had become moot.
59. Id. at 221, 223; see, supra, note 30.
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‘first and most immediate purpose [of the Establishment Clause]
rested on the belief that a union of government and religion
tends to destroy government and to degrade religion.’”60
Obviously that boundary can be crossed without there being any
victims with coercive injury. If there are no victims of coercion,
then there is no one with traditional standing to sue. In
Schempp, no one had traditional standing so the Court supplied
standing by the proxy of unwanted exposure.
Chamberlin v. Dade County Board of Public Instruction61
summarily struck down prayer and devotional Bible reading in
the Dade County, Florida, public school district. The plaintiffs
were parents of school-aged children enrolled in junior high and
elementary schools in Dade County.62 The plaintiffs’ standing to
raise an unwanted-exposure claim was not challenged before the
Supreme Court, but standing would seem to follow from Engel
and Schempp.
Stone v. Graham63 struck down a state law requiring the
posting of the Ten Commandments in all public school
classrooms in Kentucky. The plaintiffs described themselves “as
a Quaker, a Unitarian, a non-believer, a mother of school age
children and public school teacher, two children of compulsory
school age attending public schools, a Jewish Rabbi, and as
taxpayers.”64 Plaintiffs’ standing to raise an unwanted-exposure
claim was not challenged before the Supreme Court, but once
again standing would follow from Engel and Schempp.
Marsh v. Chambers65 upheld a state legislature’s practice of
hiring a chaplain to offer a prayer at the beginning of each day
when the legislature is in session. The plaintiff was described as
“a member of the Nebraska Legislature.”66 The Court noted that
60. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 221.
61. 377 U.S. 402 (1964) (per curiam).
62. Chamberlin v. Dade Cnty. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 160 So.2d 97, 98

(Fla. 1964).
63. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
64. Stone v. Graham, 599 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Ky. 1980). Being a local
taxpayer is relevant to taxpayer standing, but not to unwanted-exposure
standing.
65. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
66. Id. at 785.
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the plaintiff “claiming injury by the practice is an adult,
presumably not readily susceptible to ‘religious indoctrination,’ or
peer pressure.”67 While the government had challenged the
plaintiff’s standing in the federal circuit court,68 it did not again
press the issue before the Supreme Court.69 Although standing
was thus conceded, the Supreme Court volunteered the following:
“[W]e agree that Chambers, as a member of the legislature . . .
has standing to assert this claim.”70 Accordingly, by dictum we
know that a person vested with the status of a legislator and
regularly in the legislative chamber when the voluntary prayer
takes place was sufficient proxy to have standing in this
unwanted-exposure case.
Lynch v. Donnelly71 upheld a municipal practice of displaying
a nativity scene of Mary, Joseph, and the Christ child as part of a
larger Christmas holiday scene in a private park. The display
was located in the heart of the Pawtucket, Rhode Island,
shopping district.72 The plaintiffs were described as Pawtucket
“residents and individual members of the Rhode Island affiliate
of the American Civil Liberties Union, and the affiliate itself.”73
The Court’s majority opinion does not discuss standing, thus it
appears the government did not challenge plaintiffs’ unwantedexposure injury as giving rise to standing. If standing had been
challenged, the argument would be that plaintiffs were citizens of
Pawtucket and that was material to their standing, that is,
plaintiffs’ municipal citizenship led to their exposure to the
display. As municipal citizens, plaintiffs held a status that made
their unwanted exposure not only likely, but also conflicted in the
sense that their government was seen as taking sides against
them on a religious matter. The unwanted exposure was a proxy
for the injury-in-fact required of traditional standing. On the
merits, the city’s maintenance of the nativity scene was found not
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 792.
Id. at 785.
Id. at 786 n. 4.
Id. He was also described as a state taxpayer, a matter relevant to
taxpayer standing but not unwanted-exposure standing.
71. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
72. Id. at 671.
73. Id.
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to violate the Establishment Clause.
In a now prominent concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor first stated her “endorsement or disapproval” test. Her
test identifies an injury that is personal to certain plaintiffs that
the Establishment Clause is said to prevent, namely that the
Establishment Clause provides a remedy for the political
alienation that minorities suffer when one’s government takes a
position on a religious matter.74 Justice O’Connor goes on with
what in her view is the two-part nature of the relevant injury:
One is excessive entanglement with religious institutions,
which may interfere with the independence of the institutions,
give the institutions access to government or governmental
powers not fully shared by nonadherents of the religion, and
foster the creation of political constituencies defined along
religious lines. The second and more direct infringement is
government endorsement or disapproval of religion.
Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends
the opposite message.75

The “endorsement” test was thought to have possibilities for
characterizing an injury that flows from one’s status as a
municipal citizen when the church-state matter at issue is
unwanted exposure to a government’s religious expression. The
injury, writes Justice O’Connor, is in being an “outsider” to the
body politic defined by a dominant or majority religion.76 The
injury of “political outsider” has some likeness to the unwantedexposure incurred by a citizen when her government takes a
contrary view on a religious matter. Such an injury was earlier
discussed as: (i) that of a religious person whose government
74. Id. at 692; see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67 (1985) (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (In describing the harm Justice O’Connor used language like
“sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they
are insiders” and making “religion relevant to a person’s standing in the
political community.” Id. at 69.).
75. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687–88.
76. Id.
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sides with another religion; (ii) that of a nonreligious person
whose government sides with a religion; or (iii) the injury of a
religious person whose religion is harmed by too close an
embrace by the government.77 But Justice O’Connor fails to
explain by reference to history or otherwise why political
alienation is singled-out as the relevant injury. She does not say
why only religious minorities are injured. She does not say why
mere disagreement with the religious position taken by one’s
government is not sufficient harm.
Wallace v. Jaffree78 struck down a state law requiring that
public schools begin the school day with a moment of silence by
students for prayer or meditation. The law was found to have a
religious purpose.79 The plaintiff challenging the law was a
parent who sued on behalf of “three of his minor children; two of
them were second-grade students and the third was then in
kindergarten.”80 Plaintiff’s standing to challenge the state law
was not objected to by the government. However, standing would
seem to necessarily follow from Engel and Schempp.
Edwards v. Aguillard81 struck down a state law requiring
public school science classes to teach creationism whenever
evolution is taught. The law was found to have a religious
purpose.82 The plaintiffs challenging the law “included parents of
children attending Louisiana public schools, Louisiana teachers,
and religious leaders.”83 The Court went on to observe:
Families entrust public schools with the education of their
children, but condition their trust on the understanding that
the classroom will not purposely be used to advance religious
views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student
and his or her family. Students in such institutions are
impressionable and their attendance is involuntary. The State
exerts great authority and coercive power through mandatory
77. See, supra, text accompanying notes 31-32. This line of discussion is
continued infra, notes 104–08, and accompanying text.
78. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
79. Id. at 56–60.
80. Id. at 42.
81. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
82. Id. at 586–94.
83. Id. at 581.
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attendance requirements, and because of the students’
emulation of teachers as role models and the children’s
susceptibility to peer pressure.84

Thus the injury to plaintiffs’ school-age children was the natural
consequences of their status as students in the Louisiana public
schools. It was probable that the government’s expression
contradicted beliefs held by the students, be those beliefs
religious or secular, but this should have been made explicit.
Once again there was no challenge before the Supreme Court to
plaintiffs’ standing. So we can only infer that the needed proxy
for “injury” follows from Engel and Schempp.
County of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU85 involved
challenges to two local governmental displays during the
December holiday season. The Court struck down a nativity
scene inside the county courthouse, and upheld an outdoor
display of a Menorah, Christmas tree, and Liberty Banner at a
different location jointly operated by the city and county. The
plaintiffs challenging both displays were “the Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union and seven local
residents” of the city and county.86 Once again the government
did not question the plaintiffs’ standing before the High Court.
Plaintiffs were local residents, increasing the opportunity and
frequency for unwanted exposure, and thereby setting up a
conflict with their local governments because plaintiffs were
citizens of both the city and county. As with Lynch and Edwards,
the question needed more explication by the Court.
Lee v. Weisman87 struck down the practice of inviting clergy
to offer prayers at a public school commencement ceremony.
Attendance at the ceremony was voluntary, and no penalty
attached to a student who did not attend.88 The plaintiffs
challenging the practice were “Daniel Weisman, in his individual
capacity as a Providence taxpayer and as [father] of Deborah,”
and the daughter, Deborah, a student now graduated from the
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
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492 U.S. 573 (1989) (plurality op. in part).
Id. at 587.
505 U.S. 577 (1992).
Id. at 583.
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middle school and enrolled in the high school where a similar
prayer arrangement was conducted at its commencement.89
Plaintiffs’ standing was questioned. Being the parent of a student
exposed to the government’s expression, along with future
exposure being likely, were sufficient for purposes of Daniel’s
standing. The Court said:
We find it unnecessary to address Daniel Weisman’s taxpayer
standing, for a live and justiciable controversy is before us.
Deborah Weisman is enrolled as a student at Classical High
School in Providence and from the record it appears likely, if
not certain, that an invocation and benediction will be
conducted at her high school graduation.90

Once again the voluntary nature of the ceremony, hence lack of
compulsion, did not make any difference so long as the claim was
brought under the Establishment Clause where coercion need not
be shown. On the merits, the clergy-led prayer was found to be in
violation of the Establishment Clause.
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe91 struck down a
public school process whereby one student was elected by fellow
students to offer words of inspiration (with prayer as a likely
choice) over the loudspeaker before high school football games.
Participation by students was voluntary. The plaintiffs
challenging the prayer were “two sets of current or former
students and their respective mothers. One family is Mormon
and the other is Catholic.”92 The Court does not say if the
exercise or the prayer’s content was contrary to the faith of the
plaintiffs. The government did not question the standing of the
plaintiffs, but standing would seem to follow from Engel and
Schempp. On the merits, the Court held that the school’s voting
process leading to the prayer was in violation of the
Establishment Clause.

89. Id. at 584. Daniel Weisman was also described as a state taxpayer.
Paying local taxes is a matter relevant to taxpayer standing but not unwantedexposure standing.
90. Id.
91. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
92. Id. at 294.
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Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow93 concerned a
plaintiff who was denied standing to challenge the words “under
God” in the Pledge of Allegiance recited by public school
students, including his daughter, at the beginning of each school
day. The parents had never married. Although the Pledge was
optional, both the daughter and her mother, who held ultimate
legal custody, wished to have the daughter recite the Pledge.
Standing was denied because the father was a noncustodial
parent without final say in the Pledge matter. Under these
circumstances, Newdow held that being a parent without more
was not always sufficient to have standing.94
Van Orden v. Perry95 upheld the constitutionality of a
monument of the Ten Commandments, one of several
monuments on the grounds surrounding the Texas Capitol in
Austin. The plaintiff challenging the monument was described as
follows:
Thomas Van Orden is a native Texan and a resident of
Austin. At one time he was a licensed lawyer, having
graduated from Southern Methodist Law School. Van Orden
testified that, since 1995, he has encountered the Ten
Commandments monument during his frequent visits to the
Capitol grounds. His visits are typically for the purpose of
using the law library in the Supreme Court building, which is
located just northwest of the Capitol building.
Forty years after the monument’s erection and six years
after Van Orden began to encounter the monument frequently,
he sued . . . .96

The government did not question Van Orden’s standing before
the Supreme Court. As a person trained as a lawyer but without
a law office or library of his own, as well as a citizen of Texas,
perhaps the plaintiff was presumed to have visited public sites at
the State Capitol and to have taken advantage of the free use of
the state-operated law library located near the Capitol. In
93. 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
94. Id. at 13–18 (no standing based on a rule of prudence rather than

Article III limitations); see, supra, text accompanying note 37.
95. 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality op.).
96. Id. at 682.
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walking the Capitol grounds, not only had plaintiff been
personally exposed to the monument, but as a state citizen his
beliefs were at odds with the state’s message. That the plaintiff
was also a citizen of Austin would not logically figure into his
standing. Texas, not Austin, was the speaker. However, living in
Austin likely increased the frequency of his exposure to the
monument.
McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky97 struck down
depictions of the Ten Commandments placed in display cases
(arrayed with other historical documents) located in two county
courthouses in Kentucky. The plaintiffs were all too briefly
described as “American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, et
al.”98 The Supreme Court explained that in both counties “the
hallway display was ‘readily visible to . . . county citizens who
use the courthouse to conduct their civic business, to obtain or
renew driver’s licenses and permits, to register cars, to pay local
taxes, and to register to vote.’”99 More helpfully, a lower court
opinion wrote that in addition to the ACLU of Kentucky,
plaintiffs were Lawrence Durham and Paul Lee, ACLU
members.100 From the context it appears that Durham and Lee
were, respectively, residents of the two counties. Additionally,
the lower court said that the state ACLU had organizational
standing because it “has members in Pulaski County who would
have standing for the same reason that the named plaintiffs have
standing.”101
The counties suggested in their trial brief that “the Ten
Commandments were posted in order to teach Pulaski County
residents about American religious history and the foundations

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

545 U.S. 844 (2005).
Id. at 852.
Id. (citation omitted).
ACLU of Ky. v. Pulaski Cnty., 96 F. Supp.2d 691 (E.D. Ky. 2000).
Id. at 694. In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432
U.S. 333, 343 (1977), the Supreme Court articulated a three-part test for when
organizations have standing to sue on behalf of their members: (a) the members
(or some of them) would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b)
the interests the organization seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s
own purposes; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested
requires participation of individual members in the lawsuit.
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of the modern state.”102 In the federal district court the
defendants questioned plaintiffs’ standing because they lacked
any personalized injury.103 Having lost the issue at the trial level,
the defendants did not raise lack of standing before the Supreme
Court. One can infer from McCreary County that a county citizen
who would necessarily pass by the religious display while doing
routine legal transactions with her county government has the
necessary status required for unwanted-exposure standing. The
case does not say that personal exposure to the hallway displays
actually occurred. Rather, county residency was apparently
sufficient given the likelihood that if personal exposure had not
already occurred it soon would. As in Van Orden, local
citizenship led to apparent conflict between plaintiffs’ beliefs and
the governmental message in the two displays. After Lynch and
County of Allegheny, that was sufficient for standing. But the
conflict of beliefs with message should have been made explicit
by the Court. The state ACLU would have no standing in its own
right. Rather, the ACLU’s organizational standing was derivative
of that of its members by virtue of their residency in these two
counties.
* * *
As seen in the foregoing cases, unwanted-exposure standing
is reduced in rigor. What constitutes unwanted exposure is a
proxy for the individuated injury otherwise required to have
standing. Quite often individualized victims will not exist
because exposure to unconstitutional conduct by the government,
without more, leads only to a generalized grievance. Thus, a
proxy is substituted for the missing injury enabling the courts to
proceed to the merits and adjudicate these church-state claims.104
From the foregoing sixteen cases a few reoccurring factors
102. ACLU of Ky., 96 F. Supp.2d at 698.
103. Id. at 694–95.
104. On the merits, individualized injury is unneeded because “coercion” is

not required to make out a prima facie claim under the Establishment Clause.
See, supra, notes 30 and 59–60, indicating that coercion is not required. In
contrast, coercion is required to state a claim under the Free Exercise Clause.
See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971) (holding taxpayers lacked the
requisite burden on religion to pursue free exercise claim); Central Bd. of Educ.
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248–49 (1968) (same).
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can be identified: (1) plaintiff’s status (e.g., student, legislator,
citizen) leads to the unwanted exposure; (2) whether the religious
message of the plaintiff’s government is contrary to plaintiff’s
beliefs—religious or otherwise; and (3) the frequency of the
exposure. In the design of a proxy, the Supreme Court appears to
have settled on a combination of the first two factors. Even a
proxy has to have limits. Standing cannot become a parlor game
where a wannabe plaintiff connects to a Skype-link on her laptop
to view a religious display hundreds of miles away and thereby
acquires unwanted-exposure standing. Lines have to be drawn so
as not to require too little.
It is remarkable that in only four out of the sixteen cases
reviewed in this Part II was the plaintiffs’ standing questioned
before the Supreme Court. The four cases are McCollum,
Schempp, Marsh, and Weisman. These four involved plaintiffs
who were public school parents, sometimes joined by their schoolage children, and a state legislator. The rule drawn from
McCollum, Schempp, Marsh, and Weisman, and to a lesser
degree from the other twelve cases where lack of standing could
have been raised but was not, can be stated as follows: There is
unwanted-exposure standing where a plaintiff’s status has led to
being personally exposed to her government’s religious
expression, the message being one with which she disagrees, or
she has had to assume a burden to avoid any such exposure.
That the government’s message countermands a belief
(religious or otherwise) held by the plaintiff is not much
discussed by the Court.105 The basic paradigm in these churchstate cases is that the government has unconstitutionally taken
sides on a religious question. Accordingly, at some level there has
to be disagreement by the plaintiff with her own government’s
message.106 Disagreement is perhaps implicit in the fact that the

105. The consolidated cases in Schempp provide an example. In one case,
plaintiffs were students that were members of churches with teachings that
were countermanded by the school’s form of prayer and devotional Bible
reading. 374 U.S. 203, 206, 208 (1963). In the other case, plaintiffs were
atheists, thus it went without saying that their beliefs were at odds with the
school’s religious exercises. Id. at 211–12.
106. See, supra, notes 33–34, and accompanying text. To help see that
disagreement is necessary, consider that in theory a plaintiff could be
indifferent to the message (or even agree) but also believe that the government
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plaintiff is suing, but the plaintiff’s beliefs that are in contention
with her government should be openly and specifically stated.
Going forward, there needs to be acknowledgment by the Court
that unwanted-exposure standing is conditional on a clear
statement that the government’s message is unwanted because it
contradicts a serious belief held by the plaintiff—hence the
Establishment Clause objection being that her government has
taken sides against her in a religious matter.
The frequency of a plaintiff’s exposure is little discussed. It is
not a factor that the Court has said is essential to unwantedexposure standing, albeit frequency does get mention as a
makeweight. In some instances, frequency or regularity of
exposure to the government’s religious expression may be
evidence that the plaintiff has the status required to have
unwanted-exposure standing. Thus one would expect that a
citizen of a municipality that sponsors a seasonal Christmas
display will have more frequent exposure to a display on the
lawn of the city hall than say the exposure of one who resides
one-hundred miles away. Yet frequency of exposure is not a
substitute for the needed status because repeated exposure can
be contrived. For example, in preparation for the filing of a
lawsuit a future plaintiff could frequent a symbol so as to incur
“lots” of exposure. On the other hand, while some personal
exposure is assumed, repetition of the exposure may be quite
irregular even when the plaintiff is under a legal duty that led to
the exposure. An illustration is where plaintiff’s job
responsibilities are the cause of the exposure to the religious
speech. Similarly, the exposure is irregular if an employee’s job
description requires going past the government display just once
or twice a year. Even though irregular, there ought to be
standing because of the plaintiff’s status as an employee whose
job required the exposure. Also consider a plaintiff who is
summoned for jury duty and the religious symbol must be passed
by when jurors enter and leave the courthouse.107 The exposure
is violating the Establishment Clause by sponsoring the message.
107. See, e.g., Books v. Elkhart Cnty., 401 F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir. 2005)
(plaintiff with standing because unwanted exposure was of a juror).
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would be frequent for a week or two, and then drop to none at all.
Even though irregular, this unwanted exposure while fulfilling a
legal duty should lead to standing because of plaintiff’s status as
a juror. What the Court seems to be trying to avoid is standing
when the exposure is self-inflicted.
The two factors that draw the most attention by the Court
are personal exposure to the unwanted message and that the
plaintiff is so situated such that she comes into contact with her
government’s message. Although these factors can be stated
separately, they are intertwined by the Court as one. Thus, for
example, plaintiff has status as a county citizen and is thereby
exposed to a religious display maintained at the local courthouse.
A plaintiff who is not a citizen of the county but who,
nonetheless, is exposed to the display, should be refused the
proxy of unwanted exposure and thus have no standing. Personal
exposure alone is insufficient. That can be self-inflicted.
Citizenship alone is insufficient. Rather, it is the status of
citizenship that in turn leads to the personal exposure that
permits standing.108 It is also sensible to think that such a citizen
suffers a palpable conflict when her local government promotes
the religious message, whereas a non-citizen of that government
residing fifty miles away would not. Disagreement with someone
else’s government is insufficient. Further, standing does not turn
on how offended or emotionally distressed plaintiff is by the
government’s message. Such intensity of feeling will vary with
the plaintiff and cannot be reliably measured. Keeping the proxy
tightly defined affords some assurance that these Establishment
Clause cases are presented in an adversarial context such that
the best arguments are brought out in litigation and all relevant
facts offered into evidence.
Valley Forge is not to the contrary. It was about taxpayer
standing, not unwanted-exposure standing. It did not involve a
religious message by the government that was alleged by

108. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (citizens of two
county governments); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (citizen of a state
government); Cnty. of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573
(1989) (citizens of city and county governments); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668 (1984) (citizen of a city government).
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plaintiffs to be a case of taking sides on a religious question.
Rather, Valley Forge involved a church-state objection to the
transfer of surplus government land at no cost to a religious
college.
The taxpayer-plaintiffs in Valley Forge were dismissively
said to have mere psychological injury as a result of observing
conduct by government of which they disapproved.109 This injury
was characterized as a generalized grievance, not anything like
the injury required by Flast for taxpayer standing. In Valley
Forge the federal government was being sued for its conduct—the
transfer of surplus land to a religious college—not for
sponsorship of a religious message. The denial of taxpayer
standing in Valley Forge does not mean that the Court would
reject standing by a plaintiff who was suing because his status as
U.S. citizen was the cause of his personal exposure to an
unwanted religious message. It would be unusual, however, for
the status of U.S. citizenship to be the cause of such personal
exposure. An example might be a plaintiff’s naturalization
ceremony held at a local church which is begun with an
invocational prayer.
Valley Forge must not be read to confuse two things. The
sentence referencing “psychological” disagreement with the
government as insufficient injury was in the context of rejecting
taxpayer standing. However, psychological disagreement—or

109. With respect to the alleged church-state violation observed by plaintiff,
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., and others in Valley
Forge, Court held:

Although [Americans United and the other plaintiffs] claim that the
Constitution has been violated, they claim nothing else. They fail to
identify any personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of the
alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence
presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one
disagrees. That is not an injury sufficient to confer standing under
Art. III., even though the disagreement is phrased in constitutional
terms. It is evident that [plaintiffs] are firmly committed to the
constitutional principle of separation of church and State, but
standing is not measured by the intensity of the litigant’s interest or
the fervor of his advocacy.
454 U.S. 464, 485–86 (1982) (holding plaintiffs lack taxpayer standing to
challenge government plans to give surplus land to religious college).
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something more accurately described as plaintiff’s beliefs
conflicting with a government’s message—is a proper factor when
it comes to unwanted-exposure standing.110 A conflict between
belief and message is the basis of adversity between plaintiff and
her government where the basic problem is government taking
sides on a religious question.
Just because an unwanted-exposure plaintiff is allowed
standing to sue, that does not mean that she will prevail on the
merits. In particular, care should be taken not to conflate
unwanted-exposure standing with “no-endorsement,” the latter
being a test that goes to the merits.111 Whether a religious
symbol or other religious expression by the government violates
the Establishment Clause is often a difficult assessment—one
that goes to matters beyond whether plaintiff has the proxy of
unwanted exposure such that she has standing to sue.112

110. The possibility for confusion between these two matters is illustrated
by City of Edmond v. Robinson, 68 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517
U.S. 1201 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by Scalia and Thomas,
JJ.). On the merits, the circuit court held that a Latin cross on a municipal seal
violated the Establishment Clause. Plaintiffs’ standing had not been
challenged. As Chief Justice Rehnquist observed, the only basis for plaintiffs’
standing was that they were non-Christians living and working in the city. Id.
at 1202. Three Justices would have granted certiorari on the question of
standing. With reference to the Valley Forge passage on “psychological” injury,
the Chief Justice said that “[m]ere presence in the city, without further
allegations as to injury, quite clearly fails to meet the standing requirements” of
the Court’s cases. Id. That is unquestionably true, but not a full account of the
facts. When the case is one of unwanted exposure, and the plaintiffs have shown
both that as non-Christians their beliefs conflict with the message and that
they are citizens of the municipality and thereby in disagreement with their
own government, then there would be standing. See, supra, text accompanying
notes 105–06.
111. Steven Smith suggests that relaxed standing is attributable to the
Court’s use of the endorsement test. Smith, supra note 3, at 439–40. However,
the advent of the endorsement test was in Lynch (1984), whereas unwantedexposure standing started at least as early as Engel (1962) and Schempp (1963).
112. Compare Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680–85, and Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783, 793–94 (1983) (finding that the government’s religious message did not
violate the Establishment Clause), with McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 869–74,
and Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 373 U.S. 203, 224–25 (1963)
(finding that the government’s religious message did violate the Establishment
Clause).
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III. SALAZAR V. BUONO AS ILLUSTRATIVE
Here I utilize the factual record in Salazar v. Buono113 to
illustrate some features of unwanted-exposure standing and to
test its boundaries. The underlying claim in Salazar was that a
Latin cross in a national land preserve was allowed to remain
after the cross’s presence was called to the government’s
attention, all in violation of the Establishment Clause. Although
lack of unwanted-exposure standing was raised before the
Supreme Court, the government was bound to a finding of
standing in the lower courts because it had not been timely
appealed.114 But that does not prevent the interesting facts of
Salazar from being a helpful illustration.
In 1934, the Veterans of Foreign Wars erected a Latin cross
on a location known as Sunrise Rock in the Mojave Desert in
southeastern California.115 This had not been authorized by the
federal government, who owned the property. The cross was a
memorial to members of the armed forces who died in the Great
World War. In 1994, the land where the cross is located became
part of the Mojave National Preserve, which is administered by
the National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior. The
Mojave National Preserve consists of 1.6 million acres of federal
land in the Mojave Desert, with 86,600 acres of private land
within its boundaries.
The plaintiff, Frank Buono, filed his lawsuit in March 2001
seeking a declaration that the Latin cross on government land
violated the Establishment Clause, as well as an injunction
ordering the cross’s removal. Buono was a retired employee of the
National Park Service residing in Oregon. He had retired four
years earlier in 1997. When employed by the Park Service Buono
had been assigned to the Mojave Preserve from January 22, 1995
to December 10, 1995. It was during this eleven-month period
that Buono learned of the Latin cross and visited the site at
113. 559 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (plurality op.).
114. 130 S. Ct. at 1814–15 (during the first appeal the court of appeals

concluded that there was standing and that holding is now binding on the
government as a matter of preclusion).
115. The facts recited here are from uncontested findings of the district
court. See Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp.2d 1202, 1204–07 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
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Sunrise Rock. Buono first became troubled when there was a
request to erect a Buddhist stupa near the cross.116 The request
was denied by Buono’s superiors. At the time Buono believed it
was wrong for the cross to remain while similar access was
denied for the stupa.
Although now retired and living in Oregon, Buono retained
an active interest in the Mojave National Preserve and visited
two to four times per year. When visiting the Preserve, Buono
had taken to avoiding Sunrise Rock so as not to be re-exposed to
the cross, such avoidance being, in his view, a government-added
burden because it meant not using Cima Road. One can see the
Latin cross from the highway where Cima Road passes by
Sunrise Rock. Cima Road is the most convenient road for
accessing other areas of interest within the Preserve.
Buono is a Roman Catholic but testified that he did not find
the Latin cross religiously injurious. Rather, he said that he
objected in two respects: (i) the cross remained at Sunrise Rock
while access was denied to similar displays such as the Buddhist
stupa; and (ii) when the National Park Service failed to remove
the cross (understood as a symbol of Christianity) from
government land there was an ongoing failure to properly
separate church and state.
The lower federal courts held that Buono had personalized
injury such that he had standing to bring his claim alleging a
violation of the Establishment Clause. The federal district court
wrote:
Buono is deeply offended by the cross display on public land in
an area that is not open to others to put up whatever symbols
they choose. A practicing Roman Catholic, Buono does not find
the cross itself objectionable, but stated that the presence of
the cross is objectionable to him as a religious symbol because
it rests on federal land.117

First quoting with approval this passage by the district court, as
well as taking note of Buono’s recent avoidance of Cima Road, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals went on to observe that:

116. A stupa is a mound-like structure containing Buddhist relics.
117. Buono, 212 F. Supp.2d at 1207.
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Buono is, in other words, unable to “freely us[e]” the area of the
Preserve around the cross because of the government’s
allegedly unconstitutional actions. . . . We have repeatedly
held that inability to unreservedly use public land suffices as
injury-in-fact. . . . Such inhibition constitutes “personal injury
suffered . . . as a consequence of the alleged constitutional
error,” beyond simply “the psychological consequence
presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one
disagrees.”118

Buono testified that as a Catholic he suffered no religious injury
at seeing the cross. He did not claim that the cross was contrary
to Catholic teaching.119 Nor did he claim that the Latin cross, as
a symbol of Christianity, was debased through its appropriation
by the government for patriotic purposes.120 That left two
possibilities for Buono’s injury-in-fact: (1) harm because others
cannot erect their symbols in the same general area where the
118. Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 547 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
Subsequent proceedings involving the merits of the Establishment Clause claim
appear at Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp.2d 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2005), and Buono v.
Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008).
119. It is not essential for unwanted-exposure standing that the
government’s religious message be in conflict with a religious belief of Buono.
See, supra, notes 105–06 and accompanying text. But it is essential that there
be some sort of conflict with Buono’s beliefs whether secular or religious,
because the paradigm here is government unconstitutionally taking sides on a
religious matter.
120. As discussed in the text accompanying notes 33–34, supra, the heart of
the Establishment Clause violation here is government taking sides in a
religious matter. The third of the three ways in which government can take
sides is where an individual’s religion is harmed by too close an embrace of her
religion by the government. This can take the form of the government
appropriating religious symbols and employing them to legitimate actions of the
State or simply to unify the people behind the State. But for religion to be used
in this way will ultimately harm plaintiff’s religion. This corrupts religion, as
many statesmen such as James Madison noted during the founding period. See,
supra, note 32 (citing to arguments by Madison). And such corruption has been
noted by Justices on the Supreme Court as one of the harms to be prevented by
the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 725 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting how government’s use of Christmas nativity
scene “mut[es] the religious content”); id. at 727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(“The crèche has been relegated to the role of a neutral harbinger of the holiday
season, useful for commercial purposes, but devoid of any inherent meaning and
incapable of enhancing the religious tenor of a display of which it is an integral
part. The city has its victory—but it is a Pyrrhic one indeed.”).
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cross is located; and (2) harm that the cross, understood as a
Christian symbol, stands on government property contrary to
Buono’s beliefs concerning the demands of church-state
separation. From the Ninth Circuit’s statement quoted above, the
circuit court—while noting both of these two harms as Buono’s
injury-in-fact so as to have standing—relied principally on the
second. Moreover, the circuit court found this harm sufficiently
weighty such that Buono had taken the step of avoiding Cima
Road and thereby incurring additional travel burdens as he
explored the Mojave National Preserve.
Buono lacks third-party standing to complain that others are
denied access to Sunrise Rock such that they might erect their
own symbols.121 For example, to the extent that Buono alleged
harm on behalf of the Buddhist who sought to erect a stupa, that
is a third-party claim for which Buono lacks standing.122
Buono’s church-state claim of injury-in-fact is more involved.
Buono’s alleged injuries were: (1) unwanted exposure to the cross
because of the government’s failure to meet its duty of churchstate separation which required, in his view, removal of the cross
from government land; and (2) self-restricted use of Cima Road to
avoid his being re-exposed to the cross each time he travels by
Sunrise Rock. The first allegation is a generalized grievance like
that of any individual who is disappointed by his nation’s lack of
vigilance in rooting out church-state violations. Buono alleged
that there was a violation of the Establishment Clause, but he
alleged nothing else. Adding that he was “deeply offended,”
without more, changes nothing. And Buono’s second allegation of
injury-in-fact was one of self-restricted use of Cima Road because
of his alleged harm in viewing the cross. The second alleged

121. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 510 (1975) (summarizing those
limited instances when third-party standing is permitted, none of which apply
here).
122. Such an averment attempts to state a free speech claim that equal
access is being denied in a limited public forum, not a claim under the
Establishment Clause about religious speech attributable to the government.
Cf. City of Pleasant Grove, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009). The
government declining access for the stupa likely had nothing to do with its
symbolic message. Given that this was a land preserve, it is likely that the
National Park Service sought to not create a public forum of any sort.
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harm (avoiding exposure) thereby logically collapses into the first
(actual exposure).123
Buono’s circumstances were different from that of the
parents and their school-age children exposed to unwanted
prayer and devotional Bible reading in Abington School District
v. Schempp:124
“The parties [in Schempp] are school children and their
parents, who are directly affected by the laws and practices
against which their complaints are directed.” . . . .The plaintiffs
in Schempp had standing, not because their complaint rested
on the Establishment Clause—for as Doremus [v. Board of
Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952)] demonstrated, that is
insufficient—but because impressionable schoolchildren were
subject to unwelcome religious exercises or were forced to
assume special burdens to avoid them.125

The students suffered more than being deeply offended by what
they believed to be a violation of the Establishment Clause. The
Supreme Court’s unwanted-exposure precedents require that
plaintiffs’ status causes them to be personally exposed to the
religious expression of the offending government, or else forced to
assume a special burden to avoid such exposure. In Schempp, the
plaintiffs’ circumstance of compulsory school attendance was
such that their status as students brought them into personal
exposure to the unwelcomed prayer and biblical devotions, or else
forced them to assume special burdens to avoid the exercises.
Buono’s claim of an ongoing injury was that he would suffer
unwanted exposure if he traveled to observe the cross, or he was
“forced to assume special burdens to avoid” being re-exposed to
what he deemed a church-state violation. However, Buono’s
status did not subject him to personal exposure to the cross. He
was a retired employee of the National Park Service residing in

123. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1151
(2013) (plaintiffs’ contention that they have standing because they proceeded to
incur certain costs in response to the risk of harm was unavailing because the
underlying risk was speculative as well as self-inflicted).
124. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
125. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, 454 U.S. 464, 487 n. 22 (1982).
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Oregon. Buono’s frequent visits to the Preserve were at his own
free will. It would be different if Buono were currently employed
by the Park Service and his job duties required that he travel
Cima Road past Sunrise Rock. Buono was no doubt sincere in his
being aggrieved that the federal government was violating the
Establishment Clause. But this was a mere generalized
grievance.
Frank Buono’s status does not fit the Supreme Court’s proxy
for unwanted-exposure cases. He had no responsibilities or
rights as a local or state citizen, such as in McCreary County and
Van Orden, causing him to visit Sunrise Rock. If we assume
Buono was a U.S. citizen that too would be of no avail as nothing
about his federal citizenship caused him to visit the Latin cross.
He held no status as a student, like in Schempp, which required
his presence at the site of the Latin cross, nor was he like the
legislator in Marsh needing to be present in chambers to properly
perform the duties of his elected office. Assuming Buono paid the
admission fee to enter the Mojave National Preserve, certainly he
had a legal right to be present at Sunrise Rock, but his presence
there was not a legal duty. Any exposure to the cross would be
self-inflicted.
Buono’s circumstance is different only in degree from that of
a citizen of the Peoples’ Republic of China who, as a resident
alien with a five-year visa to reside and attend university in
Massachusetts, takes a road trip to southeastern California and
pays the admission fee to enter the Mojave Preserve and happens
to see the Latin cross from his automobile as he drives by Sunrise
Rock. This is one of those instances where if Buono has Article
III standing, then the entire population of people within the
jurisdiction of the United States (citizen or alien) has standing
based on a chance exposure to the cross during an automobile
ride. That would make the unwanted-exposure proxy require
personal exposure and nothing more. None of the Court’s sixteen
cases set out in Part II are nearly so expansive.
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IV. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AS A STRUCTURAL
RESTRAINT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR REDUCED-RIGOR
STANDING
In cases involving unwanted exposure to religious symbols or
other religious speech fairly attributable to the government, we
have seen that plaintiffs often fail to meet the usual “case” or
“controversy” requirements for standing. In such cases—as well
as cases involving taxpayer standing—the Supreme Court has
allowed reduced-rigor standing so as to ease the path to reaching
the merits.126 Why has it done so?
The Court’s modern view of the Establishment Clause was
instituted sixty-six years ago with its decision in Everson v.
Board of Education of the Township of Ewing.127 Because both
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses are pro-religious
freedom,128 the question arose as to how the two clauses were to
126. Sometimes a claimant under the Establishment Clause does have
individualized injury that meets all of the normal requirements for standing.
But this is the exception, not the rule. These personalized harms run from
economic loss, to inability to qualify for public office, to restrictions on academic
inquiry. Consider the department store in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,
472 U.S. 703, 707 (1985) (increased employment regulation resulting in
economic harm), the tavern in Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 118
(1982) (denial of a liquor license resulting in economic harm), the public school
teacher desirous of expanding the science curriculum in Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97, 100 (1968) (hindrances to academic inquiry resulting in criminal
charges and loss of job as injury), the forced taking of a theistic oath by a
freethinking atheist in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (inability to
qualify for public office as injury), shuttering one’s business on Sunday in
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 422, 430–31(1961) (economic harm to
retail stores and criminal fines imposed on their employees), and closing one’s
retail store on Sunday in Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley,
366 U.S. 582, 592 (1961) (lost business as economic harm).
127. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Everson incorporated the Establishment Clause
making it applicable to state and local governments. Id. at 14–15.
128. Just like the First Amendment is pro-freedom of speech and profreedom of the press, the First Amendment is also pro-freedom of religion.
However, being pro-freedom of religious is markedly different from being proreligion. The latter is prohibited by the modern Establishment Clause, thereby
maintaining the requisite government neutrality. But the First Amendment is
pro-religious freedom. Moreover, this is as true of the Establishment Clause as
it is of the Free Exercise Clause. While commonplace to some, others will be
surprised to have the Establishment Clause portrayed as pro-religious freedom.
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be distinguished. The Court’s answer came fifteen years later in
Engel v. Vitale129 and was reaffirmed a year later in School
District of Abington Township v. Schempp.130 As the Engel Court
said:
Although these two clauses may in certain instances overlap,
they forbid two quite different kinds of governmental
encroachment upon religious freedom. The Establishment
Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon
any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated
by the enactment of laws which establish any official religion
whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving
individuals or not.131

The Court went on to explain that the reason coercion is not
an element of a prima facie claim is that the Establishment
Clause is first and foremost about the separation of church and
state.132 Disestablishment deregulated religion, to the dual
purpose of protecting both church and state.133 Separation
between these two centers of authority is not due to any hostility
to religion. Rather, it is to protect both the autonomy of the
They mistakenly think the Religion Clauses at odds. For discussion as to why it
is impossible for the two clauses to be in tension, see Carl H. Esbeck, “Play in
the Joints between The Religion Clauses” and Other Supreme Court Catachreses,
34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1331 (2006).
129. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
130. 374 U.S. 203, 221, 223 (1963).
131. 370 U.S. at 430.
132. Id. at 425–36.
133. See, e.g., id. at 421, 431–35 (1962), where the Court said:
[The Establishment Clause’s] first and most immediate purpose
rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to
destroy government and to degrade religion. . . . The Establishment
Clause thus stands as an expression of principle on the part of the
Founders of our Constitution that religion is too personal, too sacred,
too holy, to permit its ‘“unhallowed perversion” by a civil magistrate.
....
. . . These men knew that the First Amendment, which tried to put an
end to governmental control of religion and of prayer, was not written
to destroy either. . . . It is neither sacrilegious nor anti-religious to say
that each separate government in this country should stay out of the
business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that
purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the
people choose to look to for religious guidance.
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churches and to prevent division within the body politic that
comes from government taking sides on a religious question.
It thus developed in the post-Everson Court that the Free
Exercise Clause was confined to addressing those situations
where a religious practice or observance had come under state
coercion. Without evidence of coercion, the free exercise claim
failed on the merits.134 As such, the Free Exercise Clause is a
rights-based claim. It runs in favor of religious individuals,
including any religious groups that they might form.135
The Establishment Clause operates quite differently. It runs
against the government, limiting sovereign power over certain
subject matters, namely, “law[s] respecting an establishment of
religion.”136 An individual claimant need not show religious harm
or personalized injury to win a claim under the Establishment
Clause.137 This came about because—unlike free exercise which
is rights-based—the Court’s modern Establishment Clause is
about setting apart a separate sphere for religious autonomy.138
134. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 320 (1980) (free exercise claim
failed because there was no showing of compulsion of religious belief); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1973) (plurality op.) (coercion required to state
free exercise claim); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248–49 (1968) (same).
135. To state a claim that involved coercion with respect to a religious
practice did not mean that every free exercise claim would be successful. And
after the decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), fewer
free exercise claims do succeed.
136. See Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural
Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1998). A more summary
statement of the evidence that this Court has applied the Establishment Clause
as if it were structural in nature, as well as how such a view explains not only
this Court’s special standing rules with respect to no-establishment but other
validations as well, see Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a
Structural Restraint: Validations and Ramifications, 18 J. OF L. & POLITICS 445,
453–71 (2002).
137. See, supra, notes 30, 59–60.
138. Borrowing from Justice Frankfurter, Justice Brennan in dissent
describes the restraint on governmental power imposed by the Establishment
Clause in this manner:

[T]he Establishment Clause “withdr[aws] from the sphere of
legitimate legislative concern and competence a specific, but
comprehensive area of human conduct: man’s belief or disbelief in the
verity of some transcendental idea and man’s expression in action of
that belief or disbelief.” That the Constitution sets this realm of
thought and feeling apart from the pressures and antagonisms of
government is one of it supreme achievements.
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When that desired boundary between church and state has been
crossed, the harm or injury might be religious or it might be
nonreligious. As the Supreme Court said in McGowan v.
Maryland:139
If the purpose of the “establishment” clause was only to insure
protection for the “free exercise” of religion, then what we have
said above concerning appellants’ standing to raise the “free
exercise” contention would appear to be true here. However,
the writings of Madison, who was the First Amendment’s
architect, demonstrate that the establishment of a religion was
equally feared because of its tendencies to political tyranny and
subversion of civil authority.140

For the state to improperly support or advance religion can
result in harm other than religious harm, e.g., the loss in
McGowan was economic.141 Indeed, a church-state violation can
result in instances where no one has individualized injury and
hence no one has conventional standing to sue. This will look
much like a generalized grievance where there is no standing.142
The modern Supreme Court’s work to keep these two centers
of authority, church and state, rightly ordered has caused the
Establishment Clause to operate in many respects like the
structural clauses of the Constitution which separate the powers
of the three federal branches. Just as some violations of
separation of powers can occur with no one being personally
harmed, much the same occurs when there is a putative violation
of the modern Establishment Clause but no one with injury-in-

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 726 (1984) (quoting from McGowan v.
Maryland).
139. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
140. Id. at 430.
141. See, supra, note 126 (collecting Establishment Clause cases where the
individualized injury was other than religious harm).
142. A trio of “generalized grievances” cases is represented by Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (plaintiff states a
colorable violation of structural clause in the Constitution but no one with
individualized injury, hence no one has standing to sue), United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (same), and Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633
(1937) (per curiam) (same).
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fact. The archetypal case before the Court was Flast v. Cohen,143
and the Court responded by permitting limited federal taxpayer
standing. The proxy of taxpayer with injury-in-fact permitted the
post-Flast Court to reach the merits of some no-establishment
claims that would otherwise be nonjusticiable because no one had
the individuated injury to acquire standing. That line of cases
has evolved to Hein and Winn.144
The other line of these cases is where plaintiffs claim injury
due to unwanted exposure to religious speech by government, but
who do not suffer the coercion that would normally be associated
with the individualized injury required for standing. Early on, as
we saw in Part II, the most common case was a public school
student exposed to voluntary religion classes, prayer, or biblical
devotions. Because the exposure was voluntary, there was no
coercion (which should not be mistaken with peer pressure) and
hence no free exercise claim. The Court’s response was to reduce
the rigor of the injury-in-fact to allow standing to sue so long as
the plaintiff invoked the Establishment Clause. Like Flast, this
necessarily required a proxy for the missing injury. As shown by
the cases in Part II, the Court has required a plaintiff with a
status that led to her personal exposure to the message with
which she disagrees. That included not just students and
legislators, but also citizens suing their local municipality or
county. In both the instance of taxpayer and of unwantedexposure standing, creating a proxy for the needed “injury”
permitted the Supreme Court to reach the merits of an
Establishment Clause claim.
CONCLUSION
Since handing down its first unwanted-exposure decision in
McCollum in 1948, the Supreme Court has continued to permit
reduced rigor in the injury-in-fact requirement for standing.
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs in these cases do need to be attentive
to two matters. First, plaintiffs need to clearly state their beliefs,

143. 392 U.S. 83 (1968); see text accompanying notes 8–10, supra
(discussing Flast).
144. See text accompanying notes 13–30, supra (discussing Hein and Winn).
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religious or otherwise, that are in disagreement with the
government’s religious message. It is not the intensity of the
plaintiffs’ “offense” or the degree of “psychological” upset.145 It is
sufficient to show a mere disagreement between plaintiffs’ beliefs
and the government’s message. At bottom, these church-state
cases are about the government taking sides on a religious
matter, and plaintiffs’ injury is that she and her government
have a different view on the religious matter.
Second, the government must have caused the alleged
constitutional wrongdoing. Plaintiffs thus must hold a status
which led to exposure to the government’s religious message.
Exposure without more is insufficient, as is a high frequency of
exposure. Such a status is easy to grasp when it involves
students in a public school, as well as with respect to jurors and
public employees who have legal duties that result in the
unwanted exposure. The government as causative agent of the
wrong can become confused when plaintiffs’ status entails
citizenship. To date there are no cases in the High Court where
U.S. citizenship has led to unwanted-exposure standing. There
are several cases, however, where being a citizen of a local
municipality or county has led to standing, provided that
plaintiff’s citizenship is in the local government that is the source
of the unwanted religious message. A citizen of a nearby
municipality or county does not have an adversarial relationship
with the defendant-government. Thus the plaintiff is adverse
only when it is her own city or county that has caused the
message.
The “injury” in these unwanted-exposure cases is nearly nonHohfeldian.146 There is no tort, no breach of contract or economic

145. See, Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 486 (1982) (“It is evident that [plaintiffs] are
firmly committed to the constitutional principle of separation of church and
State, but standing is not measured by the intensity of the litigant’s interest or
the fervor of his advocacy.”).
146. Claims that are not personal to an individual or association of
individuals are referred to as non-Hohfeldian. See, e.g., Flast, 392 U.S. at 119 n.
5 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The term comes from a venerable article setting forth
several types of legal rights. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
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loss, no injury to real or personal property. There is no violation
of a statutory or constitutional right. There is, however,
disagreement over the content of the message. There is also a
putative violation of the Establishment Clause, which is regarded
by the Court not as rights-based, but like a structural violation of
the Constitution. The Establishment Clause negates any
jurisdiction of the government in “mak[ing] . . . law respecting an
establishment of religion.” When this desired boundary between
church and state becomes in some respect crossed, there is often
no one with individualized injury, hence, no individual with the
injury-in-fact to have traditional standing.
At this juncture, the Supreme Court faced a decision. It could
have said that because of the absence of a case or controversy in
the conventional sense, there was no standing under Article III of
the U.S. Constitution. That path would have led to underenforcement of the Establishment Clause.147 First in McCollum,
and later in Engel, Schempp, and so on, the Supreme Court took
a different path. It created a proxy for injury-in-fact and thereby
allowed the civil courts to reach the merits in these unwantedexposure lawsuits. A roughly parallel path was taken by the
Court with respect to taxpayer standing. The rest is sixty-six
years of history, from McCollum to Schempp and Marsh to
Weisman with respect to unwanted-exposure standing, and from
Flast to Winn with respect to taxpayer standing. It remains to be
seen if the Supreme Court attempts to retreat from unwantedexposure standing, as it has with taxpayer standing. At present,
no push in that direction has caught on in the federal courts. Any
forthcoming cutback in reduced-rigor standing would mean that
no-establishment principles will go unexamined or underenforced. That prospect ought to be received with some concern
because the principles of church-state separation protect religion
from being exploited in service of the government’s own
ambitions. The political branches will sometimes use religion in a

147. It must be acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s reduced-rigor
standing is in tension with another of the Court’s oft-repeated teachings,
namely, under the assumption that if plaintiffs have no standing to sue, no one
would have standing, is not a reason to find standing. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l
USA, 568 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1154 (2013) (collecting cases).
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manner that mixes God and Country,148 and that cannot but
compromise religion and debase its symbols.

148. Conservative Christians can be their own enemy with respect to public
symbols “because their habits have so led them to confuse America with God’s
salvation.” STANLEY HAUERWAS, IN GOOD COMPANY: THE CHURCH AS POLIS 55-56
(1997).
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